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The Reversal of the Gender Gap in Education, 
Motherhood, and Women as Main Earners in Europe 
 
Abstract Men have historically attained more education than women, but this gender 
imbalance in education has reversed in many countries. In recent cohorts, the wife typically 
has as much as or more education than the husband. Using data from the EU-SILC 
(N=95,389 for 27 countries), this paper investigates to what extent the newly emerging 
pattern of educational assortative mating is associated with a higher proportion of women 
who out-earn their partners in Europe. We find that this proportion varies on the country level 
between 20% and almost 50% for childless women and is generally much lower for women 
with small children. However, if a woman is better educated than her partner, this clearly 
increases the odds that she earns more than half of the couple’s joint earnings. This happens 
to such an extent that it reduces the effect of motherhood on the wife’s relative earnings: 
college educated mothers of school-age children with less educated partners are nearly as 
likely to be main breadwinners as college educated childless women in a homogamous union.  
 
Keywords: marriage; union formation; education; assortative mating; gender roles; family income 
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Introduction 
Over the past decades, participation in advanced education has increased, first among men 
but next even more among women. Since the 1990s, there are more women than men 
enrolled in higher education worldwide. In many countries, women now outnumber men in 
college level education and graduate more successfully. This affects age-old patterns of 
assortative mating which are no longer compatible with the distribution by age, sex, and 
education. Recent studies have shown that the reversal of gender inequality in education has 
undermined the traditional pattern of hypergamy (women marrying up) and that hypogamy 
(women marrying down) has become more prevalent (Esteve et al., 2012; Grow and Van 
Bavel, 2015; De Hauw et al. 2017). 
Changing patterns of educational assortative mating are expected to affect family 
dynamics (Van Bavel, 2012; Schwartz and Han, 2014). A major reason is that an increase of 
hypogamy is likely to affect who is contributing most to the family budget: if the wife is 
higher educated than the husband, she may have a higher earning potential in the paid labour 
market – this paper uses “husband” and “wife” to denote married couples as well as people in 
unmarried cohabitation. This is bound to affect decision-making related to his and her labour 
market participation and to childbearing.  
Yet, the reversal of the gender gap in education need not necessarily lead to a reversal 
of the gender earnings gap within the family. There are several reasons why a gap to the 
disadvantage of women may persist. One of them is that the choice of study subjects in 
education and the selection into occupations in the labour market remain strongly gender-
biased, with men typically selecting the more lucrative branches (Blau et al., 2013; Mandel 
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and Semyonov, 2014). Another reason is the persistence of a “motherhood penalty”: women 
tend to scale down their paid labour market activity after having children, and this negatively 
affects their earnings. Social norms may also inhibit women to become the main breadwinner. 
As a result, they continue to earn less than their male partners particularly in families with 
children (Budig et al., 2012). Even though dual-earning and female breadwinner families 
have been on the rise in recent decades (Raley et al., 2006; Vitali and Arpino 2016), families 
with the husband as the main earner still form the majority of households. Hence, it remains 
an empirical question to what extent the reversal of the gender gap in educational attainment 
is associated with a higher likelihood that she earns more than him within couples. 
This paper investigates how educational pairings are associated with the likelihood 
that the wife earns more than her partner, and how this interacts with motherhood status. 
Drawing on the European Union’s Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), 
we first describe how common it is in European countries for women to be the main earner 
and how this is associated with women’s relative education. To assure that our assessments 
do not just reflect the situation before or after the 2008 financial crisis, we combine the 2007 
and 2011 rounds of the EU-SILC. Next, we analyse the differences between childless women 
and mothers across European countries. Using multinomial regression analysis, we 
investigate how educational pairings interact with motherhood status. The central question 
here is whether the motherhood penalty on relative earnings is moderated by relative 
education. 
The next section draws two main hypotheses from the relevant literature about 
educational assortative mating, women’s labour market activity, and the motherhood penalty. 
After detailing the data and methods used, we first chart our descriptive results and then 
present the results from a multinomial model on how educational pairings affect relative 
earnings within married as well as cohabiting couples. We find that the emerging pattern of 
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educational hypogamy is clearly associated with a higher likelihood that the woman is the 
main breadwinner. This happens to such an extent that it counteracts a large part of the 
negative effect of motherhood on her contribution to the household income. 
Background and hypotheses 
Educational assortative mating 
Differences between the relative contributions of spouses to the household budget are partly 
driven by educational assortative mating. The traditional male breadwinner model was linked 
with a male advantage in education and a pattern of educational hypergamy (women 
marrying up in terms of education). With the expansion of female participation in college 
level education, homogamy has become the modal marriage pattern in most Western 
countries over the course of the 20th century (Schwartz and Mare, 2005; Blossfeld, 2009; 
Schwartz, 2013).  
With the reversal of the gender gap in education, educational hypogamy (women 
selecting a less educated partner) has recently become more common than the traditional 
hypergamy (Esteve et al. 2012; Grow and Van Bavel 2015; De Hauw et al. 2017). If the wife 
has more education than the husband, she may also be more likely to be the main 
breadwinner. However, this need not necessarily be the case. “Marrying down” runs against 
traditional gender roles, and US data on relative earnings suggest that unions where she earns 
more than him are still less common than could be expected given the reversal of gender 
inequality in education (Bertrand et al., 2015). In most countries the gender pay gap is still to 
the disadvantage of women (Christofides et al., 2013). This persistence is related to women’s 
choice of study subjects and occupations, the degree of attachment to the labour market and 
how this connects with childbearing and child-rearing. These factors are now discussed in 
more detail. 
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Gender and paid work 
The relative contribution of partners to the joint income will depend directly on their activity 
in the paid labour market and wage levels, which is affected by his and her education. For 
both men and women with moderate education, the gains from labour market activity and the 
opportunity costs of staying at home are relatively low; conversely, for those with more 
education, the gains from paid labour and the opportunity costs of staying at home are higher 
(Becker, 1993).  
Micro-economic theory states that such gains and opportunity costs have implications 
for the gender division of labour. If both partners have a low level of education, the need for 
income will encourage employment in both partners, but low income potential and low 
opportunity costs of staying at home will discourage employment, and at the same time the 
demand for low skilled workers may be limited. In such cases, after taking into account the 
demand side factors, it remains an empirical question whether the high need for income or 
the low opportunity costs will dominate for him and for her. Research in wealthy countries 
has typically found the opportunity cost effect predominating for women and the income 
effect for men, signalling the persistence of gender norms (England, 2010). Women more 
often stay at home when they have children, since the costs of outsourcing childcare 
undermine the incentives for paid labour, particularly among women with a low level of 
education. So, among homogamous couples with a low level of education, she is expected to 
earn less income, all else equal, particularly when they have children.  
Following the same logic of income effects and opportunity costs, hypergamous 
couples may find it economically more beneficial if he specializes in paid labour market 
activity and she specializes in housework and childcare (Becker, 1993). The opposite might 
hold in case of hypogamy: when she is higher educated than he, the income effect might 
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dominate for her rather than for him and the opportunity cost of staying at home may be 
lower for him than for her. This may stimulate women to focus more on their careers. 
Indeed, along with their increased college completion rates, women’s labour market 
participation as well as their wage levels have grown more than that of men (Thévenon, 
2013). The wage premium of college education has become greater for women than for men, 
which has motivated women to invest more in their education (Goldin et al., 2006). Women’s 
standard-of-living gains from higher education appear to have increased more than that of 
men, too (DiPrete and Buchmann, 2006). This holds especially in times of high male 
unemployment rates. A recent study showed that male unemployment is a major reason for 
women to be the main earner of their families (Vitali and Arpino 2016). 
This growing involvement of women in the paid labour market has been uneven 
across countries, however. Varying gender regimes sustain gender inequality to varying 
degrees, but even in gender equal Scandinavian countries men’s employment is higher than 
women’s (Pascall and Lewis, 2004). There are both institutional and cultural reasons for this 
– and the former often reflect the latter. Institutional reasons include policy arrangements that 
either facilitate or discourage women’s employment through the tax system, childcare or 
labour market regulations (Neyer and Andersson, 2008). Cultural reasons include beliefs and 
norms that underpin the male breadwinner–female homemaker family model (Esping-
Andersen, 2009) and may motivate couples to avoid that she earns more than him. Situations 
where the wife out-earns the husband could violate normative expectations about what it 
means to be “a real man” and “a real woman” (Bertrand et al., 2015), and such violation of 
gender identity entails costs that people tend to avoid (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). 
Furthermore, women tend to choose study subjects and occupations with lower earning 
potential than men (Blau et al., 2013; Mandel and Semyonov, 2014). 
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It therefore remains an empirical question whether or not the reversal of the gender 
gap in education and the increased prevalence of hypogamy imply that women are more often 
the main contributors to their family budget. Hence, the first hypothesis to be tested in this 
paper is that educational hypogamy is associated with a higher proportion of matches where 
the wife earns more than the husband compared to both homogamy and hypergamy. 
Motherhood and relative income 
Women with children tend to earn less income, both compared to their husbands and 
compared to women without children. The presence of very young children in particular leads 
to lower involvement in the paid labour market and, hence, lower relative earnings (Budig 
and England, 2001; Budig et al., 2012). The literature mentions several explanations for 
lower earnings of mothers, involving both causal and selection effects (Petersen et al., 2010; 
Cooke, 2014).  
The basic causal explanation is that childbirth usually implies some time away from 
paid labour: most women temporarily retreat from the labour market upon childbirth, 
resuming work again as the youngest child gets older, be it often part-time only (Budig et al., 
2012). Reconciling childrearing with paid work becomes more or less viable when the 
youngest child reaches an age when there are more options for formal child care and school. 
The reduction in earnings and income due to motherhood has been found to depend on 
features of the labour market, policy measures, as well as cultural attitudes towards family 
and gender roles (Neyer and Andersson, 2008; Gangl and Ziefle, 2009; Budig et al., 2012; 
Dotti Sani, 2015). Given the importance of human capital in the types of jobs carried out by 
college educated women, the motherhood penalty due to a slowdown of human capital 
accumulation is stronger for women with a high level of education than for women with less 
education (Anderson et al., 2002).  
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The negative correlation between motherhood and income may also be due to 
selection effects (Waldfogel, 1998; Petersen et al., 2010). Women who are more family-
oriented may be opting out of the more lucrative but highly time-consuming careers and 
spend more time with their children. Lower educated women may be more home-centred 
than highly educated women (Lück and Hofäcker, 2008). We may therefore expect that the 
association between motherhood and breadwinner status would vary depending on 
educational attainment.  
The motherhood penalty on absolute earnings is likely to affect negatively women’s 
relative earnings compared to their male partners’. In this paper, we address the latter: we 
expect that the association between motherhood and relative income is not equal across 
assortative mating categories. Women in hypergamous couples, facing lower opportunity cost 
of childbearing, are more likely to focus on care work at home while the husband with 
relatively higher earnings focuses on work in the paid labour market. For hypogamous 
couples, the opposite is expected to happen more often, where the woman’s withdrawal from 
the labour market may result in a more substantial cut in the family budget. Therefore, our 
second hypothesis is that the reduction in the likelihood to be the main earner associated with 
motherhood is smaller for women in hypogamous unions compared to other types of unions. 
Or, to look at this interaction the other way around, that the relative earnings bonus 
associated with hypogamy is larger for mothers than for childless women. 
Data and methods 
We use the European Union’s Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), an 
annual survey which in most countries uses a rotating panel design with a length of four 
waves. Each subsequent wave replaces part of the sample and the entire sample is renewed in 
four years (Atkinson and Marlier, 2010). This study uses cross-sectional data from the 2007 
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and 2011 waves, which ensures that samples do not overlap. The income reference period is 
the year previous to the interview, so our income data cover earnings in 2006 and 2010, 
respectively. We selected countries that are represented in both years and this makes for 27 
countries in total (see Table A1 in Appendix). 
We selected women who are living with a partner at the time of the survey, either 
married or unmarried, and who are at least 25 and up to 45 years old. To calculate the 
contribution of the female partner, only couples where at least one partner earned some 
positive income were included. A woman’s contribution to the joint couple’s earnings (which 
we will also denote by her “relative income” or her “share”) is based on yearly gross income 
earned as an employee or through self-employment. We carried out a number of robustness 
checks to see whether our results depend on the income specification (net rather than gross 
income, with or without including transfers, see online supplementary material). The results 
of these alternative analyses are entirely in line with the ones presented below.  
After excluding individuals with missing information and couples without any 
earnings, the study sample counts 95,389 couples (50,655 in 2007 and 44,734 in 2011 
respectively). Table A1 in the Appendix displays sample sizes per country included, along 
with basic descriptive statistics of the main variables featuring in the analysis and with a 
description of the sample selection and exclusion process.  
The woman’s share is the ratio of the woman’s earnings to the sum of both partner’s 
earnings, ranging from 0.0 to 1.0. In most countries, the frequency distribution of this 
variable peaks firstly at 0.0 (the woman does not contribute any income) and secondly just 
before the 0.5 line of equal-earning couples. Figure 1 depicts the frequency distribution of the 
woman’s share in each country, with the exclusion of the proportion of couples where she 
earns no income at all. The reason for excluding this group from the graph is that in some 
countries the strong concentration of couples in this group dominates the picture so much that 
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it would hide important patterns in other countries. We have printed the percentage of couples 
where she earns no income in the upper left corner of each panel. The percentages are 
particularly high (more than 25%) in Greece, Italy, and Spain as well as in Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Romania. Next, a notable feature of the distribution in most countries 
is “the cliff” at the 0.5 line: the distribution exhibits a sharp drop right at the point when the 
wife starts to earn more than the husband. Bertrand et al. (2015) make a similar observation 
for the US and interpret it as a sign that gender roles imply that women and/or men avoid the 
situation where she out-earns him as it would threaten their gender identity (cf. Akerlof and 
Kanton 2000).  
These features of the frequency distribution of women’s share in the joint couple 
earnings have motivated us to distinguish between three groups of women: those who earn 
nothing or just a small fraction of the joint income (0–10% of the joint income, called 
“dependent women”), women who contribute a substantial portion but no more than half of 
the income (11–50%), and women who have passed the “cliff” in the frequency distribution 
by earning more than their partner (51–100%, called “breadwinner women”). The latter 
category is of central interest in this paper. We have experimented with alternative 
categorizations, including versions with women contributing 0%, with a middle category of 
women contributing 40–60%, a category of women earning 90–100%, and a binary version 
distinguishing those earning more than 50% from the rest. These alternatives yielded the 
same conclusions as the ones reported below.  
We used multinomial logistic regression to model the probability that a woman is in 
the dependent (0–10%) or in the breadwinner category (51–100%) as opposed to being a 
contributing spouse (11–50%, i.e., the reference category). The primary purpose of the model 
is to test the effects of combinations of his and her education and motherhood, and their 
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three-way interactions on relative earnings. From the model we predicted probabilities of 
belonging to the breadwinner category to facilitate correct interpretation.  
 
<FIGURE 1 Distribution of the woman’s contribution to the couple earnings by country, 
about here>  
 
EU-SILC measures educational attainment with the ISCED-97 scale, which we 
collapsed into three groups: low (ISCED levels 0–2, up to the second stage of basic 
education), medium (ISCED 3–4, secondary education or post-secondary but not tertiary) and 
high education (ISCED 5–6, university level bachelors, masters and PhD’s). This collapsing 
implies a loss of information and amplifies the level of homogamy. But we preferred to use 
wider categories to ensure that the crossing of their boundaries corresponds to major 
differences in educational attainment in the European context.  
Motherhood status is the next key explanatory variable. EU-SILC lacks information 
on the number of children ever born, it only includes children who are living in the same 
household. Hence, what we will capture in this paper is really the effect of having a child 
living at home, not the effect of parenthood per se. We distinguish between three categories: 
childless women, mothers whose youngest child is up to 3 years old, and mothers whose 
youngest child is at least 4 years old.  
The regression analysis controls for woman’s age, the age difference between the 
partners, marital status, and income reference year (2006 versus 2010). In addition, 
considering that women in poorer families are more likely to be breadwinners (Winslow-
Bowe, 2006), we control for the absolute level of family income by including a country-
specific quintile of the joint couple earnings in our regression model. Table A1 in Appendix 
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gives basic, country-specific information about the distribution of each of the variables of 
interest. 
Empirical results 
Descriptive findings 
Educationally homogamous couples form the majority of the sample and they are the 
dominant group in every country (for details by country, see Table A2 in Appendix). The 
proportion of homogamous couples ranges from about 50% in Iceland to well over 70% in 
Central and East European countries such as Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, 
and Slovakia. Most of the homogamous couples have either a medium or high level of 
education. Among couples of unequally educated spouses, hypogamous couples are more 
common than hypergamous ones in the vast majority of countries. Only in Austria, Czech 
Republic, Germany, and Romania is the proportion of hypergamous couples higher than the 
proportion of hypogamous unions. The dominance of hypogamy over hypergamy 
corresponds to the new gender gap in education and confirms the pattern reported in earlier 
studies (Esteve et al., 2012; Grow and Van Bavel, 2015). Our data also demonstrate that 
matches between the college educated and people with just primary education are rare, but if 
they happen, it is more common that the wife rather than the husband has the college degree. 
We also find a positive correlation across countries between the proportion of hypogamous 
couples (Table A2 in Appendix) and the proportion of women who earn more than their 
partner (Table A1 in Appendix): the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.48, indicating that 
about a quarter of the variance of the proportion of female main breadwinners is covered by 
the proportion of couples where the woman has a higher level of education than the man.  
To explore how relative earnings are associated with educational pairings, Figure 2 
displays for each country the proportion of women who earn more than their partner by 
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combinations of his and her education. Educational pairings that were represented by less 
than 20 observations in the sample are excluded from the graph. As should be expected, 
women’s education is positively associated with the share of them earning more than their 
husbands in all countries. Husband’s education, on the other hand, is negatively related to the 
proportion of women earning more than their husbands: the higher his education, the lower 
her share in the income. This is most clearly visible in Germany, Hungary, and Luxembourg, 
for example. Across the board, and disregarding sampling error for the time being, it clearly 
matters whether she is in a homogamous or hypogamous relationship: in case of hypogamy, 
the proportion of female breadwinners is higher in all countries. This holds for college 
educated women in particular. There are differences between countries, but the basic pattern 
is very general and in line with our first hypothesis (which will be tested more formally 
below).  
 
<FIGURE 2 Proportion of women earning more than their partner by country and her and his 
education, about here > 
 
Figure 3 shows how motherhood status is associated with the proportion of female 
breadwinners. Women earning more than half of the joint income are most common among 
the childless. In Lithuania, Latvia, and Slovenia, more than 40% of childless women are main 
earners. They are least common among those with toddlers. Still, at least one in five mothers 
with toddlers is the main or sole breadwinner of her household in France, Iceland, Portugal, 
Slovenia, and Spain. Among women with children above age 3, the proportion of 
breadwinners generally falls in between the two mentioned categories. We now turn to 
regression analysis to find out how educational pairings interact with motherhood to affect 
the breadwinner status. 
15 
 
 
<FIGURE 3  Proportion of women earning more than their partner by country and 
motherhood status, about here> 
 
Regression analysis 
We fitted a multinomial logistic regression model of the wife’s relative earnings with 
interaction between both partners’ education and the wife’s motherhood status. Regression 
coefficients are reported in Table 1. Here, we focus on the probability that the wife is earning 
more than the husband. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the multinomial model, 
Figure 4 plots predicted probabilities of being the breadwinner by both her and his 
educational attainment and by the woman’s motherhood status. Confidence bounds of point 
estimates are calculated so that non-overlap of confidence bars indicates statistically 
significant difference at p<0.05 level (see Goldstein and Healy 1995). Three vertical panels 
are defined by the motherhood condition (youngest child 0–3 years old, youngest child aged 
4 or more, childless). The wife’s education is on the horizontal axis of each panel and line 
type refers to the husband’s education.  
The wife’s own educational attainment strongly affects the predicted probability to be 
the main earner across all three motherhood categories: it is lowest for women with a low 
level of education, in between for women with a medium level of education, and highest for 
the highly educated women. The differences between women with a low and medium level of 
education are sometimes small and not always statistically significant; those between women 
with a medium and high level of education– by far the two most numerous groups – are 
bigger and statistically significant, with predictions being at least 10 percentage points higher 
for the highly educated. The size of these differences depends also on the education of the 
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husband. As can be seen in Figure 4, the predicted probability that she is the main earner is 
lower if the male partner is highly educated in about all conditions of Figure 4 (although not 
always statistically significant for smaller groups, as indicated by the larger confidence 
intervals). Like for her education, the differences between low and medium educated men are 
mostly small and statistically not significant. 
Combining his and her education, our results imply that, at a given level of the wife’s 
education, hypogamous women tend to be the main breadwinner more often than 
homogamous or hypergamous women. This holds for a model without the interaction with 
motherhood (not shown) and it holds across all motherhood conditions, but the difference is 
biggest, and statistically significant, for mothers who are highly educated wand whose 
youngest child is at least 4 years old (see the middle panel of Figure 4). Such highly educated 
mothers are much more likely to be the main earner when their husbands have only medium 
or low educational attainment, compared to when their husbands also have high attainment 
levels. The difference between homogamous and hypogamous highly educated women 
amounts to more than 10 percentage points in this group. For medium educated mothers with 
children at least 4 years old, the difference is rather between hypergamous unions on the one 
hand and homogamous and hypogamous ones on the other hand: in the former group the 
proportion of female breadwinners is predicted to be up to 10 percentage points lower than in 
the latter group. While the same pattern holds for women without children and for women 
with children under age 4, the differences are statistically significant only for highly educated 
women with young children. If they are highly educated and in a homogamous union, they 
are less likely to be breadwinners compared to their counterparts who are in a hypogamous 
union.  
A key research question was how the motherhood penalty on relative earnings 
interacts with combinations of his and her education. Figure 4 shows that motherhood is 
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associated with lower relative earnings across all educational pairings (compare the first two 
panels with the right hand panel). Childless women are predicted to be the main earner most 
often (see also parameter 0.655 in Table 1) and women with children under age 4 least often 
(–0.229 in Table 1). Next, our estimates show that hypogamy is associated with a lower 
motherhood penalty on relative earnings, particularly for highly educated women. The middle 
panel of Figure 4 illustrates that, for highly educated women with children aged 4 years and 
more whose husbands have less education, the predicted probability to be the main 
breadwinner is around 0.35. This is relatively close to the level predicted for childless highly 
educated women who are in a homogamous union (Figure 4, right hand panel). For medium 
educated women with children over age 3, both homogamy and hypogamy is significantly 
associated with a higher chance to be the main earner, compared to peers in more traditional 
hypergamous unions. Among women with a low level of education, regardless of motherhood 
status, we do not see significant differences across different educational pairings in the 
probability to be the main earner. All in all, our second hypothesis thus finds partial support: 
hypogamy reduces the gap in relative earnings due to motherhood primarily for women with 
advanced education. For medium educated women, the effect is smaller than for the highly 
educated. Note, however, that our cross-sectional data do not allow us to tell to what extent 
the reduction in the relative earnings gap is due to the selection of particular types of mothers 
into both hypogamy and motherhood, and to what extent this reflects a causal effect of 
hypogamy on relative earnings among mothers.  
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<FIGURE 4 Model predicted probability that she earns more than her partner by educational 
pairing and motherhood status, about here> 
 
As for the control variables in our model (Table 1), the model finds no statistically 
significant difference between year 2006 and 2010. The variable of joint earnings quintile has 
a negative gradient both for the odds of being in the dependent group and for the odds of 
being the breadwinner. Low family income often means that one partner earns very little or 
nothing, which explains why women in poorer families are more likely to be either dependent 
on the partner or take the role of the breadwinner. We have also fitted a version of our model 
without these control variables. The results for the effects of the educational pairings and 
motherhood status do hardly change. If anything, the simplified model reinforces our 
conclusions for these focus variables.  
Conclusion and discussion 
Figure 1 showed that there is a “cliff” in the distribution of women’s relative contribution to 
their household income at the 50% line which is fairly consistent across European countries: 
while a growing proportion of women earns up to almost 50% of the joint income, the 
proportion suddenly drops once we pass the 50% line. This paper has investigated whether 
the emerging pattern of educational hypogamy is associated with a growing tendency to cross 
that ‘cliff’, i.e., with a higher proportion of wives out-earning their husbands. More 
specifically, we have tested whether hypogamy moderates the negative association between 
motherhood and relative earnings in European couples. We found that this indeed the case. 
College educated women in homogamous unions are less likely to be main earners than 
hypogamous peers. The difference is largest for mothers with children above age 3. 
Hypogamy is alleviating the negative effect of motherhood on relative earnings. College 
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educated women whose youngest child is above age 3 are almost as likely to be the main 
breadwinner as college graduates without children in homogamous unions. For women with a 
low level of education, there are no significant differences depending on the educational 
attainment of the partner. They are least likely to be the main breadwinner irrespective of the 
educational attainment of the male partner. For women with a medium level of education, 
partners’ education does matter, but the differences in its effect are smaller.  
 Our study clearly has some important limitations. First is that we have only looked at 
his and her educational attainment levels but not at the role played by their respective fields 
of education. The field of study clearly has strong implications for the earning potential in the 
labour market. Field of study has also been shown to be related to both the transition to 
motherhood, the earning potential, as well as to attitudes about gender roles (Van Bavel, 
2010). Choice of study disciplines along gender-stereotypical lines might explain why men 
remain the main breadwinner in the majority of cases, even in hypogamous couples. 
Unfortunately, the data used in this paper do not allow inclusion of field of study.  
 Second, our analysis focused on women’s relative earnings compared to their male 
partners’ only. As a result, we cannot draw conclusions about how educational pairings affect 
women’s absolute earnings and about whether educational pairings increase or alleviate the 
motherhood penalty on absolute earnings. Given the positive association between his and her 
absolute earnings and between educational attainment and wage level, we would expect that 
the motherhood penalty would also be lower among hypogamous women in terms of absolute 
earnings. However, recent research suggests that there may also be a parenthood penalty on 
earnings for men, particularly on the low end of the income distribution (Cooke 2014), so this 
merits further investigation.  
Third, our modelling results present an overall, average pattern across countries, 
leaving the remaining country heterogeneity unaddressed. The descriptive statistics presented 
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in this paper demonstrate notable country differences in the proportion of female 
breadwinners. Depending on how highly educated the population of a given country tends to 
be, his and her relative education may be differentially associated with women’s relative 
income. Also, the tax and benefits arrangements that apply in a particular country may have 
an important impact on a husbands’ and wives’ employment decisions, perhaps particularly 
on who is the main and the secondary earner (Thévenon 2013). Addressing the role of such 
macro-level factors is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 Fourth, our findings on the association between educational pairings and women’s 
share in the family income should not be interpreted as pure causal effects. A reason to be 
cautious about this is that the selection into union as well as parenthood and divorce risks 
may correlate with woman’s income and educational level, with variation from country to 
country. It could be argued that well-educated and high income earning women are more or 
rather less likely to marry and have children, depending on the country context, and more or 
less likely to dissolve existing partnership due to higher individual economic security. Some 
women may be selected into motherhood for unobserved reasons that may also affect their 
mate choice as well as their relative earnings, creating a set of correlations that reflects this 
selectivity rather than a causal effect of relative education on relative earnings. It is also 
possible that there is selection into certain types of educational pairings as a function of 
individuals’ earning potential (Dribe and Nystedt, 2013).  
 Nevertheless, our main finding is robust: the pattern of female educational hypogamy 
that is emerging in most Western countries is associated with a higher proportion of women 
who earn more than half of the family income. We believe this represents a major trend with 
potentially important implications for the demography of family formation and reproduction 
(see Van Bavel, 2012 for a review). We speculate that the rise of female breadwinners will 
interfere with the traditional household calculus of decision making about childbearing. The 
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main theoretical reason for this it that it affects the opportunity costs for households of letting 
the wife retreat from paid labour to engage in homemaking and child care. On the one hand, 
the opportunity cost of having a child would be higher for the family where the wife is the 
main earner, if having a child implies some retreat from the labour market. So, at first sight, 
female breadwinners may be expected to have lower fertility compared to women who 
contribute less than half of the household income. Yet, on the other hand, if the wife’s 
earnings are higher than the husband’s, she will have more power in deciding how to spend 
the money. She will have more leverage to spend it on ways to outsource household tasks and 
childcare rather than on, say, expensive consumer durables (Lundberg, Pollak and Wales, 
1997; Basu, 2006). This will dampen the opportunity costs of childbearing and may give 
women more leverage to realize their personal family size ideals.  
There is a second way in which the rise of female breadwinners may dampen the 
opportunity costs of childbearing. Higher relative earnings may also affect the division of 
labour within the household (Evertsson and Nermo, 2007). In the past, women generally had 
less power in the couple than men because they earned less income. Women’s power was 
further reduced because their options after potential union dissolution were limited due to 
their specialization in unpaid household labour (England, 2010). Since men had more power 
than women, men have been more able to resist doing household labour when they do not 
want to do it, whereas women had to give in even if they disliked the same tasks in the 
household (Poortman and van der Lippe, 2009). The “gender revolution” has been very 
uneven so far, in that women have caught up with men in education and the labour market 
much more than men have caught up with women in household work (Goldscheider, 
Bernhardt and Lappegård 2015). This may change as more women become their households’ 
main breadwinners. If men catch up with women in taking care of the household work and 
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children, this may further dampen the opportunity costs of having children. As a “gender 
equity dividend” (Anderson and Kohler 2015), this may in turn stimulate fertility. 
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Tables 
TABLE 1 Multinomial logistic regression of women’s share in couple earnings: regression 
coefficients and standard errors 
 0–10%  51–100%  
 
Coef.  SE Coef.  SE 
Motherhood status     
Childless –0.593*** (0.094) 0.655*** (0.146) 
Child aged 0–3 0.725*** (0.138) –0.229*** (0.068) 
Child aged 4+ Ref. 
 
Ref. 
 Her–His education 
    Low–Low 0.468** (0.145) –0.158 (0.104) 
Low–Medium 0.596*** (0.075) –0.319** (0.110) 
Low–High 1.333*** (0.245) 0.037 (0.301) 
Medium–Low 0.228** (0.085) 0.335*** (0.094) 
Medium–Medium Ref. 
 
Ref. 
 Medium–High 0.680*** (0.130) –0.356*** (0.067) 
High–Low 0.331 (0.191) 1.178*** (0.123) 
High–Medium –0.028 (0.133) 1.079*** (0.082) 
High–High 0.299* (0.147) 0.417*** (0.068) 
Interaction terms 
    Childless X Her–His education 
   Low–Low 0.200 (0.192) –0.176 (0.177) 
Low–Medium 0.326 (0.229) –0.421 (0.277) 
Low–High –0.288** (0.099) –0.350 (0.347) 
Medium–Low 0.156 (0.088) –0.337* (0.134) 
Medium–High –0.149 (0.092) 0.120 (0.088) 
High–Low 0.445* (0.219) –0.376 (0.217) 
High–Medium 0.245 (0.148) –0.458*** (0.109) 
High–High 0.099 (0.067) 0.067 (0.112) 
Child aged 0–3 X Her–His education 
   Low–Low –0.322 (0.181) 0.210 (0.159) 
Low–Medium –0.121 (0.203) 0.275 (0.329) 
Low–High –0.798** (0.306) –0.321 (0.739) 
Medium–Low –0.359* (0.174) 0.007 (0.156) 
Medium–High –0.236** (0.087) 0.451*** (0.091) 
High–Low –0.624* (0.311) 0.116 (0.226) 
High–Medium –0.218 (0.176) 0.086 (0.143) 
High–High –0.213 (0.139) 0.421*** (0.116) 
SOURCE: EU-SILC 2007 and 2011, own calculations. 
 
Note: we have carried out log-likelihood chi-squared tests to test the statistical significance of 
each of the variables included in the model, as well as of each of the interaction effect. All 
these tests show that the variables as well as the included interactions are statistically 
significant at the level of p<0.001. 
 
(Continued on next page)
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TABLE 1 Multinomial logistic regression of women’s share in couple earnings: regression 
coefficients and standard errors (continued) 
 0–10%  51–100%  
 Coef. SE Coef. SE 
Her age 0.017** (0.006) 0.040*** (0.004) 
Year 2010 0.052 (0.064) 0.077 (0.056) 
Joint earnings quintile     
1 1.942*** (0.223) 1.406*** (0.075) 
2 0.856*** (0.108) 0.291*** (0.054) 
3 Ref.  Ref.  
4 –0.591*** (0.107) –0.141*** (0.036) 
5 –0.769*** (0.164) –0.348*** (0.076) 
Age difference of partners 0.021*** (0.003) 0.009** (0.003) 
Marital status      
Married Ref.  Ref.  
Never married –0.446*** (0.083) 0.238*** (0.067) 
Divorced, separated –0.457*** (0.078) 0.185* (0.075) 
Countries     
AT Ref.  Ref.  
BE –0.629*** (0.028) 0.046 (0.024) 
BG –0.445*** (0.027) 0.438*** (0.025) 
CY –0.581*** (0.017) –0.089** (0.033) 
CZ 0.269*** (0.015) 0.071*** (0.013) 
DE 0.254*** (0.020) 0.163*** (0.017) 
DK –1.496*** (0.046) 0.005 (0.027) 
EE 0.268*** (0.040) 0.271*** (0.020) 
ES 0.085* (0.034) 0.326*** (0.020) 
FI –0.600*** (0.039) 0.026 (0.022) 
FR –0.438*** (0.032) 0.256*** (0.020) 
GR 0.677*** (0.041) 0.482*** (0.024) 
HU 0.228*** (0.014) 0.601*** (0.015) 
IS –0.919*** (0.041) 0.032 (0.028) 
IT 0.285*** (0.027) 0.228*** (0.015) 
LT 0.061*** (0.017) 0.837*** (0.031) 
LU –0.127*** (0.030) 0.215*** (0.023) 
LV –0.068*** (0.019) 0.726*** (0.021) 
NL –0.823*** (0.032) –0.355*** (0.022) 
NO –1.151*** (0.040) –0.349*** (0.031) 
PL 0.499*** (0.022) 0.767*** (0.023) 
PT –0.494*** (0.055) 0.600*** (0.033) 
RO 0.466*** (0.027) 0.491*** (0.020) 
SE –0.997*** (0.045) –0.044 (0.030) 
SI –0.921*** (0.024) 0.736*** (0.027) 
SK –0.160*** (0.020) 0.170*** (0.023) 
UK –0.218*** (0.021) 0.071*** (0.014) 
Constant –1.948*** (0.260) –3.279*** (0.153) 
Pseudo R2  0.136    
N 95,389    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001   
NOTE: sample weights and country-clustered robust standard errors used. The left block of coefficients refer to 
the log-odds of being dependent on the husband as opposed to earning 11–50% of the couple income; the right 
hand block refers to the log-odds of earning 51–100% of the couple income, as opposed to belonging to the 11–
50% group. The first horizontal block in the table gives the estimated effects of motherhood status when both 
she and he are medium educated (i.e., the reference category for educational pairing) and the effects of 
educational pairings for couples who have children above age 3 (i.e., the reference category). The blocks of 
coefficients below that are estimates for the interactions between educational pairing and being childless or 
having a child below age 4, respectively.  
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APPENDIX: Sample Selection and Sample Sizes 
 
From the EU-SILC samples of 2007 and 2011 combined (N=1,149,891), we selected women 
who are at least 25 and less than 45 years old and have a partner in the household 
(N=104,407). After excluding couples with negative income (this can be due to losses from 
self-employment), the sample size is N=103,832. We then further limited the sample to 
couples where at least one partner has earned income (N=101,454). Next, couples with 
missing information about either partner’s education were removed (remaining N=99,115). 
Then 314 same-sex couples were excluded. Since Ireland, Switzerland, and Malta are 
represented only in one of the two survey waves, we excluded these three countries 
(remaining N=95,498). Finally, we removed cases that had missing values in the woman’s 
marital status and the sample ended up with 95,389 observations.  
 
TABLE A1 Sample size and distribution of main variables by country 
Country  Woman’s relative earnings  Woman’s education Man’s education 
  0–10% 11–50% 51–100% Low Mid High Low Mid High 
 N % % % % % % % % % 
Austria 2,933 30.9 53.4 15.7 17.0 61.8 21.2 10.1 66.0 23.9 
Belgium 2,591 17.6 58.8 23.6 8.7 37.6 53.7 14.6 42.1 43.2 
Bulgaria 2,269 20.0 56.1 23.9 20.2 51.7 28.1 20.4 61.4 18.2 
Cyprus 1,983 20.9 60.8 18.3 12.5 42.9 44.6 18.6 46.2 35.2 
Czech Rep. 3,963 32.3 53.2 14.5 4.4 76.9 18.7 3.0 78.6 18.4 
Germany 5,004 32.1 48.4 19.5 6.2 55.6 38.2 4.2 49.7 46.1 
Denmark 2,659 10.2 64.1 25.7 11.0 46.7 42.3 14.7 51.6 33.6 
Estonia 2,281 27.0 51.6 21.4 8.0 44.9 47.1 10.5 60.2 29.3 
Spain 5,689 29.8 48.2 21.9 33.7 25.7 40.6 41.8 24.7 33.5 
Finland 4,463 17.5 57.7 24.8 6.1 39.7 54.2 10.9 50.2 39.0 
France 4,804 20.8 54.4 24.8 13.2 43.6 43.2 15.6 52.0 32.4 
Greece 2,578 41.8 40.6 17.6 25.0 46.9 28.1 29.8 46.3 23.9 
Hungary 4,595 29.5 47.1 23.4 14.2 60.2 25.5 12.6 68.6 18.8 
Iceland 1,640 15.2 61.9 22.9 19.5 35.3 45.2 21.8 46.9 31.3 
Italy 8,343 37.8 45.9 16.3 37.0 46.5 16.5 45.2 42.0 12.8 
Lithuania 1,711 25.1 44.5 30.4 5.9 49.9 44.2 7.8 62.7 29.6 
Luxembourg 2,936 25.7 54.6 19.6 29.9 35.1 35.1 30.0 40.4 29.6 
Latvia 1,822 22.0 48.5 29.5 10.4 53.8 35.8 15.0 63.2 21.9 
Netherlands 5,143 20.4 62.5 17.1 15.9 46.0 38.1 18.5 43.4 38.2 
Norway 2,542 13.8 67.6 18.6 14.4 36.9 48.7 15.0 46.9 38.1 
Poland 6,494 31.7 44.2 24.1 5.4 62.9 31.7 5.5 72.4 22.1 
Portugal 1,960 21.9 53.0 25.1 58.5 21.4 20.1 69.2 19.0 11.8 
Romania 3,281 35.8 46.9 17.3 22.5 61.7 15.8 14.7 69.6 15.6 
Sweden 3,321 13.7 63.2 23.1 5.4 46.9 47.7 8.3 56.2 35.5 
Slovenia 4,804 12.5 53.5 33.9 12.4 56.1 31.4 14.6 64.9 20.5 
Slovakia 2,454 25.3 56.5 18.2 2.1 73.5 24.3 2.3 76.0 21.7 
UK 3,126 23.9 55.0 21.0 6.1 53.3 40.7 9.4 55.0 35.5 
 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE A1 Sample size and distribution of main variables by country (continued) 
Country Motherhood status Woman’s 
mean age 
Age 
difference 
of partners 
(man – 
woman) 
Income 
reference 
year 2010  Child-
less 
Youngest 
child 
aged 0–3 
Youngest 
child aged 
4+ 
 
 % % % Years Years % 
Austria 20.3 24.3 55.4 36.2 3.4 49.8 
Belgium 26.9 27.1 46.1 35.2 2.9 49.9 
Bulgaria 10.3 16.3 73.4 35.3 3.7 50.8 
Cyprus 17.0 26.0 57.0 35.1 3.9 49.8 
Czech Rep. 15.0 24.1 60.9 35.2 3.1 50.3 
Germany 29.8 22.6 47.6 35.9 3.2 47.9 
Denmark 22.6 29.3 48.0 35.5 2.6 48.2 
Estonia 14.7 25.5 59.8 34.8 2.6 51.2 
Spain 26.0 26.6 47.5 36.2 2.8 47.4 
Finland 31.3 27.6 41.1 34.8 2.6 49.3 
France 20.5 34.4 45.1 34.8 2.8 48.6 
Greece 13.9 25.6 60.5 36.4 4.9 48.0 
Hungary 14.9 20.4 64.7 35.4 3.3 46.7 
Iceland 14.5 35.8 49.7 35.0 2.5 46.6 
Italy 19.3 27.9 52.8 36.5 3.5 48.5 
Lithuania 10.4 22.9 66.7 35.4 2.7 46.0 
Luxembourg 23.1 28.1 48.9 35.8 3.3 49.9 
Latvia 12.4 22.3 65.3 35.0 2.7 50.3 
Netherlands 25.0 31.4 43.5 35.8 2.7 48.1 
Norway 18.5 29.1 52.4 35.9 3.0 53.1 
Poland 13.0 24.3 62.7 35.0 2.7 50.3 
Portugal 14.1 22.3 63.6 35.9 2.9 48.1 
Romania 15.3 13.9 70.8 35.3 3.5 50.1 
Sweden 18.6 36.2 45.2 35.2 2.9 48.9 
Slovenia 10.2 24.6 65.2 36.2 3.3 48.8 
Slovakia 10.8 16.5 72.7 36.1 2.7 50.0 
UK 27.8 28.2 44.0 35.4 2.9 51.0 
SOURCE: EU-SILC 2007 and 2011, own calculations, sample weights used for calculation of distributions, 
2007 and 2011 data pooled 
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TABLE A2 Distribution of educational pairings in the sample by country 
Country Homogamy by 
Her–His education 
Hypergamy by 
Her–His education 
Hypogamy by 
Her–His education 
 Low– 
Low 
Mid–
Mid 
High–
High 
 Mid–
High 
Low–
Mid 
Low–
High 
 Mid–
Low 
High–
Low 
High–
Mid 
 
 
 
 % % % Sum % % % Sum % % % Sum 
Austria 5.7 46.9 11.6 64.2 11.2 10.3 1.0 22.6 3.7 0.8 8.7 13.2 
Belgium 3.6 22.0 34.2 59.8 7.7 3.8 1.3 12.8 7.9 3.1 16.4 27.4 
Bulgaria 15.3 43.2 14.2 72.6 3.9 4.8 0.2 8.9 4.6 0.5 13.4 18.5 
Cyprus 6.4 27.1 27.7 61.2 6.7 5.2 0.8 12.8 9.0 3.1 13.8 26.0 
Czech R. 0.9 66.9 10.4 78.3 7.9 3.4 0.0 11.4 2.1 0.0 8.2 10.3 
Germany 1.5 33.6 24.9 59.9 20.0 3.7 1.3 24.9 2.0 0.8 12.3 15.1 
Denmark 4.4 30.7 23.9 58.9 8.6 5.3 1.2 15.1 7.4 2.9 15.6 25.9 
Estonia 2.8 33.1 22.5 58.4 6.2 4.6 0.6 11.4 5.6 2.1 22.6 30.2 
Spain 23.8 9.5 24.0 57.2 5.9 6.4 3.6 15.9 10.2 7.8 8.8 26.9 
Finland 1.7 25.1 29.5 56.3 8.7 3.6 0.7 13.1 5.8 3.3 21.4 30.6 
France 5.7 28.6 23.5 57.8 7.5 6.1 1.5 15.0 7.6 2.3 17.3 27.2 
Greece 17.0 29.7 17.1 63.7 6.4 7.5 0.5 14.3 10.9 1.9 9.1 21.9 
Hungary 6.6 48.9 13.1 68.5 5.6 7.6 0.0 13.2 5.7 0.3 12.3 18.3 
Iceland 8.5 19.7 22.6 50.8 7.2 9.3 1.5 18.1 8.4 4.9 17.8 31.1 
Italy 26.3 25.1 7.5 58.9 4.4 9.8 1.0 15.1 16.9 2.0 7.1 26.0 
Lithuania 2.0 39.6 23.0 64.7 6.3 3.6 0.3 10.2 4.0 1.8 19.4 25.2 
Luxembourg 18.8 22.2 24.2 65.2 4.2 9.9 1.2 15.3 8.7 2.5 8.3 19.5 
Latvia 5.1 39.5 15.4 60.1 5.7 4.6 0.7 11.0 8.6 1.3 19.1 28.9 
Netherlands 6.4 23.9 23.7 53.9 12.2 7.3 2.2 21.8 9.9 2.2 12.2 24.3 
Norway 3.7 21.7 28.5 53.9 7.6 8.6 2.0 18.2 7.3 3.9 16.6 27.9 
Poland 1.6 55.0 17.9 74.5 4.3 3.8 0.0 8.0 3.6 0.3 13.6 17.4 
Portugal 52.4 7.4 8.8 68.6 2.2 5.3 0.8 8.2 11.9 4.9 6.3 23.2 
Romania 10.7 53.7 11.5 75.9 4.1 11.7 0.1 15.9 3.9 0.2 4.2 8.2 
Sweden 1.5 33.5 26.5 61.5 8.1 3.0 1.0 12.0 5.2 1.5 19.8 26.5 
Slovenia 5.0 41.3 13.9 60.3 6.4 7.3 0.1 13.8 8.4 1.2 16.3 25.9 
Slovakia 0.7 63.5 13.4 77.6 8.3 1.5 0.0 9.8 1.7 0.0 10.9 12.6 
UK 3.2 38.4 25.0 66.6 10.0 2.5 0.4 12.9 4.8 1.5 14.1 20.4 
SOURCE: EU-SILC 2007 and 2011, own calculations, sample weights used for calculation of distributions, 
2007 and 2011 data pooled 
 
 
 
 
 
